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cademic researchers in economics and psy-
chology have increasingly explored the use 
of light-touch behavioral interventions to influence 
individual behavior. These efforts have led to the 
development of a number of tools to address the 
many barriers to behavior change, including fram-
ing manipulations in messaging (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1981), harnessing social incentives (Ban-
diera et al., 2010, Ashraf et al., 2014, Kraft-Todd et 
al., 2015, Bursztyn & Jensen, 2015), and making 
personal identities salient (Steele & Aronson, 1990, 
Spencer & Castano, 2007, Carr & Steele, 2010, Ben-
jamin et al., 2010, Cohn et al., 2015, Benjamin et al., 
2016, Kessler & Milkman, 2016). However, while 
behavioral interventions have shown significant 
promise, the body of evidence supporting their ap-
plicability across a variety of real-world contexts re-
mains relatively thin. 
In the policy domain, behavioral interven-
tions have increasingly been considered as tools to 
promote contributions to public goods specifically. 
This is often motivated by the mixed evidence on 
the efficacy of (small) financial incentives in field 
experiments (Kraft-Todd et al., 2015). Further-
more, even when they are effective, small financial 
incentives at the individual level can aggregate to-
gether to be quite costly when utilized at scale. 
Thus, if the expected impacts of financial incen-
tives are modest, and the expected costs non-trivial, 
the cost effectiveness of financial incentives can be 
very low. This reality has encouraged academics 
and policymakers to consider utilizing social incen-
tives for behavior change, with the argument that 
they can be cost effective tools for addressing pol-
icy challenges (Allcott, 2011, Ashraf et al., 2014, 
Hallsworth et al., 2017). Recent research suggests 
that social incentives can be particularly efficacious 
in the context of prosocial behavior (for a review, 
see Kraft-Todd et al., 2015, who discuss the incon-
sistent evidence supporting the use of financial in-
centives to promote prosocial behavior, contrasting 
it with the more promising impacts of social moti-






Abstract: We partnered with the School District of Philadelphia (SDP) to run a randomized experiment testing 
interventions to increase teacher participation in an annual feedback survey, an uncompensated task that re-
quires a teacher’s time but helps the educational system overall. Our experiment varied the nature of the in-
centive scheme used, and the associated messaging. In the experiment, all 8,062 active teachers in the SDP 
were randomly assigned to receive one of four emails using a 2x2 experimental design; specifically, teachers 
received a lottery-based financial incentive to complete the survey that was either "personal" (a chance to win 
one of fifteen $100 gift cards for themselves) or "social" (a chance to win one of fifteen $100 gift cards for 
supplies for their students), and also received email messaging that either did or did not make salient their 
identity as an educator. Despite abundant statistical power, we find no discernible differences across our con-
ditions on survey completion rates. One implication of these null results is that from a public administration 
perspective, social rewards may be preferable since funds used for this purpose by school districts go directly 
to students (through increased expenditure on student supplies), and do not seem less efficacious than per-
sonal financial incentives for teachers. 
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One alternative approach would be to of-
fer monetary “social rewards” rather than personal 
rewards as an incentive for certain behaviors (Anik 
et al., 2013). An example of this might be offering 
someone a $50 donation in their name to charity in 
exchange for doing a certain behavior, instead of 
$50 in cash for that behavior. This approach offers 
a number of benefits. First, it leverages individuals’ 
prosocial motivations and avoids some of the po-
tential pitfalls of financial incentives, particularly in 
the domain of prosocial behaviors. For example, 
one might worry that personal financial incentives 
for collectively-beneficial behavior might “crowd 
out” intrinsic motivation (Gneezy & Rustichini, 
2000). Second, social rewards might be preferable 
from the perspective of the policymaker, even if 
they are not more efficacious than personal incen-
tives, because money used for social rewards can 
improve social welfare more directly than money 
spent on private rewards. This is especially true 
when the social reward is something like a charita-
ble contribution or increased funding for public 
goods. 
Another form of behavioral intervention 
that is increasingly common in the literature is the 
use of identity salience manipulations as a way to 
change behavior. This research suggests that mak-
ing a specific “identity” salient at the moment of 
decision making might encourage individuals to 
conform to that identity by engaging in the behav-
iors associated with it (Benjamin et al., 2010, Cohn 
et al., 2015, Benjamin et al., 2016, Kessler & Milk-
man, 2016). By this logic, when seeking to encour-
age prosocial decisions, it might be effective to 
make an identity that is aligned with prosocial 
choices more salient before asking for prosocial ac-
tion. For example, in Kessler and Milkman (2016), 
the authors test the impact of making a “giving 
identity” salient in a charitable donation solicitation 
by reminding treatment subjects of their previous 
donations. They find that this manipulation signifi-
cantly increased giving rates, suggesting that re-
minders of one’s identity might have tangible im-
pacts on prosociality. Furthermore, evidence sug-
gests that identity salience interventions, in addition 
to being efficacious on their own, may be useful in 
enhancing other behavioral interventions, espe-
cially ones intended to enhance prosociality. Con-
sistent with this, many Get Out the Vote Letters 
begin with an identity salience manipulation such as, 
“You are a voter!” (Bryan et al., 2011). 
In this article, we describe an intervention 
involving an email campaign designed to test the 
impact of social versus personal rewards and an 
identity salience manipulation on prosocial behav-
ior change amongst school teachers—namely, en-
couraging teachers to complete a 30-minute annual 
survey that benefits the school district by providing 
information that helps improve the educational sys-
tem. All 8,062 teachers1 in the School District of 
Philadelphia (SDP) were included in the study sam-
ple. Our randomized design allows us to compare 
the impact of a monetary reward implemented in 
the form of supplies for teachers’ students (social) 
versus money for the teacher (personal). Further-
more, we test whether or not making a teacher’s 
professional identity as an educator more salient in-
fluences response rates, and how this identity sali-
ence manipulation might interact with the efficacy 
of social versus personal rewards. Our article con-
tributes to the growing body of literature using ran-
domized evaluations to learn more about how ac-
tors in the educational system make decisions and 
how behavioral manipulations can shape educa-
tional outcomes (Fryer et al., 2012, Kraft & Rogers, 
2015, Gehlbach et al., 2016, Levitt et al., 2016). Fur-
thermore, our results speak to literature in public 
administration on the motivations underlying pub-
lic service, and how interventions based on behav-
ioral science might be more effective than pay-for-
performance when it comes to motivating public 
sector employees (Ritz et al., 2016, Grant, 2008). 
There are useful implications of our spe-
cific manipulations for the management of public 
education systems. First, if identity salience manip-
ulations motivate teachers to act prosocially, such 
techniques would be useful levers for school dis-
tricts looking to motivate teacher behavior change. 
Second, if social rewards are (at least) as impactful 
as personal financial rewards in motivating teachers 
to take prosocial actions, it would support the sub-
stitution of social rewards in place of personal re-
wards for teachers where the latter currently exist, 
as social rewards arguably better serve the educa-
tional aims of school districts given that the money 
expended on these rewards often go directly to the 
students. 
Contrary to our expectations, our main 
findings are null results: social and personal rewards 
had roughly the same impact on survey completion, 
and identity salience had no meaningful effect on 
survey completion. Taking advantage of this large 




dataset, we also conduct non-experimental, explor-
atory analyses to determine which school character-
istics predict survey completion, in order to detect 
potential moderator variables for our treatments. 
We find that teachers at schools with higher parent 
and student satisfaction and with higher teacher rat-
ings are more likely to complete these surveys, 
while teachers at schools where students have 
fewer behavioral issues (e.g. lower suspension rates 
and higher attendance rates) are less likely to com-
plete these surveys. 
Based on these exploratory results, we 
conduct additional analyses of our treatment effects 
that provide some potentially useful (although far 
from definitive) insights. We find some evidence 
that the identity salience manipulation actually low-
ered survey completion rates at schools with rela-
tively lower-rated teachers (which was determined 
using an SDP metric on teacher effectiveness), 
while having a more positive effect on survey com-
pletion rates at schools with highly-rated teachers 
(determined using the same SDP metric). These 
findings suggest that identity manipulations like 
ours may be better suited for use at schools with 
better teachers. Finally, we find minimal evidence 
of an interaction between our identity salience ma-
nipulation and past survey completion by teachers. 
That is, the point estimate is positive, but also very 
small, suggesting that our identity manipulation did 
not trigger a meaningful “consistency” motivation 
(Gneezy et al., 2012, Freedman & Fraser, 1966, 
Mullen & Monin, 2016) for teachers who com-
pleted the survey last year. 
Taken together, these results suggest that 
the identity manipulation we designed may not be 
of practical use outside of higher quality schools, 
but that social rewards may be preferable to per-
sonal rewards as a tool to motivate teachers. That 
is, while both reward types motivated teachers 
equally well, social rewards directly increase student 
welfare more than personal rewards. More broadly, 
our findings suggest that while the use of behav-
ioral interventions in public administration shows 
promise, there is room for further testing and de-
velopment of effective, scalable interventions that 





We worked with two institutional partners to plan, 
design, and implement the randomized experiment 
we present here. First, we developed the interven-
tion directly with the School District of Philadel-
phia (SDP), who served as the implementing part-
ner. Second, we received institutional support from 
the Philadelphia Mayor’s Office, through GovPHL 
and the Philadelphia Behavioral Science Initiative 
(www.phillybsi.org), a broader effort to integrate 
behavioral science into public policy through col-
laborations between academic researchers and city 
policymakers. 
 
Subjects, Context, and Design 
The study’s sample was the full population of 
teachers employed by the School District of Phila-
delphia—a total of 8,062 teachers. Every spring, 
Philadelphia teachers receive an email from the 
school district with a link to an “end-of-year sur-
vey,” designed to elicit their feedback about various 
issues affecting schools. This survey is one of the 
primary channels through which the school district 
learns about what is happening in schools across 
the city. Therefore, increasing engagement with this 
survey is a key policy priority for the city. From an 
academic perspective, completing the survey can be 
thought of as a “cooperative” behavior on the part 
of the teacher; that is, it involves the teacher bear-
ing a personal time-and-effort cost to generate a 
collective benefit. Our intervention involved the in-
tegration of a randomized experiment into the 
standard annual procedure of sending emails to 
teachers about the survey, namely through manip-
ulations of the messaging content of the email and 
the rewards used to motivate survey completion. 
We randomly assigned teachers to one of 
four treatment groups,2 with each group receiving 
a different type of email (and three ensuing email 
reminders with consistent messaging). Our inter-
vention used a 2x2 factorial design, in which we 
varied the type of reward used (“personal” vs. “so-
cial”) and whether or not a “teacher identity” was 
made salient in the language in the email. 
The experimental conditions are shown in 
Table 1. Subjects in the personal rewards condi-
tions were offered the chance to win one of fifteen 
$100 Barnes and Noble gift cards for personal use, 
while subjects in the social rewards treatment were 
offered the chance to win one of fifteen $100 Of-
fice Depot gift cards to purchase school supplies 
for their students. To distinguish between treat-
ment groups, subjects who received the personal 
reward and no identity manipulation will hereafter 
be called the “Standard” group, those who received 




the social reward and no identity manipulation will 
be called the “Social Rewards Only” group, those 
who received the personal reward and the teacher 
identity manipulation will be called the “Identity 
Only” group, and those who received both the so-
cial reward and identity manipulation will be called 
the “Social Rewards + Identity” group. 
Note that there was no pure “control” 
group that did not receive emails (or incentives of 
some form) as part of the intervention. The reason 
for this was two-fold. First, the SDP did not want 
to offer some teachers a financial reward to com-
plete the survey and not offer other teachers a sim-
ilar financial reward (though variation in the nature 
of the reward was deemed acceptable). Second, 
from an experimental design perspective there was 
a concern about spillover effects (through word of 
mouth) if we had a control group with no incen-
tives. Also note that the emails sent to teachers in-
cluded instructions to take the survey through an 
employee portal. Copies of the exact emails sent are 
included in the Appendix. 
The initial treatment emails were sent on 
April 4, 2017, with the follow up reminder emails 
sent on April 25, May 11, and May 25. The outcome 
variable we measured was survey response for 
teachers at the individual level. There are no meas-
urement concerns with this metric, because it came 
directly from reliable administrative data and repre-
sents an explicit measurement of the policy objec-
tive from the perspective of the SDP. 
 
Power and Minimum Detectable Effects 
Our 2x2 research design was structured to test 3 
different comparisons (social vs. financial rewards, 
overall; teacher identity salience vs. no identity sali-
ence, overall; and the interaction of social rewards 
and teacher identity salience). Given that the sam-
ple size in our study was fixed, we conducted an ex-
ante power analysis for each of these three pairwise 
comparisons both without and with a Bonferroni 
correction for the three comparisons to determine 
the minimum detectable effects (MDEs) from our 
intervention. Based on conversations with the 
SDP, an effect size of roughly five percentage 
points was agreed upon as being practically signifi-
cant for policy and therefore formed the basis of 
our assessment of MDEs. Note that using the Bon-
ferroni correction of the p-value is widely regarded 
as providing very conservative estimates of power 
(Anderson, 2008). 
We used data from the 2015 and 2016 
teacher surveys to come up with an ex-ante ex-
pected completion rate for the survey in 2017. Spe-
cifically, 54% of SDP teachers completed the sur-
vey in 2016 and 57% completed the survey in 2015, 
so we used an estimate of 54% for our power cal-
culations. The results are presented in Table 2. The 
MDEs were close to our five percentage point tar-
get for practical significance for the SDP. 
Table 1 





















Minimum detectable effects 
 






8062 0.0310 0.0358 
4031 0.0438 0.0505 
Notes: This table shows the minimum detectable 
effects (MDEs) in percentage points, assuming 
power of 80 percent, when the full sample of 
8,062 teachers is considered and when only 4,031 
are considered (half the sample, for analysis of 
treatment effects, within a given condition, of the 
other condition). 
 





The method used in this intervention was a simple 
randomization carried out by the researchers using 
Stata and transferred into Excel. The randomiza-
tion was carried out at the individual teacher level 
and then shared with the SDP for implementation. 
 
Data Collection and IRB Issues 
All required data is regularly collected by the SDP. 
We obtained IRB approval from the Swarthmore 
College IRB to receive the data from the school dis-
trict and conduct the data analysis. 
We received anonymized administrative 
data at the teacher-level from the SDP on survey 
completion, along with treatment assignment and 
some basic information about each teacher 
(namely, whether they taught in the SDP in the ac-
ademic year prior, whether they completed the sur-
vey in the academic year prior, and what school 
they taught in). We also used public data on school 
performance metrics and characteristics from the 
SDP Open Data Initiative3 to gather details at the 
school level, which we merged with the teacher-
level data to supplement our analysis. 
 
Hypotheses 
Our hypotheses are based on the large body of lit-
erature on the efficacy of identity salience manipu-
lations and personal versus social incentives, draw-
ing from both rational and behavioral models of 
decision making. We had three primary hypotheses. 
First, we hypothesized that the social rewards treat-
ment would outperform the personal rewards (in 
line with Kraft-Todd et al., 2015). Note that a 
model that assumes pure self-interest would predict 
the opposite (namely that personal financial incen-
tives would outperform social incentives). Second, 
we hypothesized that the identity salience manipu-
lation would increase prosocial behavior, in the 
form of survey response by teachers (Kessler & 
Milkman, 2016). Third, we hypothesized that the 
identity salience manipulation would amplify the 
effectiveness of social rewards versus personal re-
wards. We also had one secondary hypothesis ex-
ante, namely that the identity salience manipulation 
would have a greater impact on individuals who 
completed the survey in 2016, as it serves to rein-
force the importance of behavioral consistency 
(Gneezy et al., 2012). 
We also developed one ex-post hypothesis 
based on exploratory data analysis around the pre-
dictors of survey completion. Specifically, having 
found that teachers from higher-quality schools 
(i.e., schools with more highly-rated teachers and 
higher parent/student satisfaction in SDP perfor-
mance metrics), were more likely to complete the 
survey in general, we hypothesized that both the 
social rewards and identity salience manipulations 
would be more impactful for teachers from these 
schools. The logic for this was that our manipula-
tions would have a greater impact on teachers with 
more prosocial preferences and/or a stronger com-
mitment to their careers as educators, relative to 
other teachers. We are able to provide suggestive 
evidence for this hypothesis. 
 
Analytical Approach 
In order to assess the success of the intervention, 
we use simple linear probability model regressions 
(OLS regressions with a binary outcome). We also 
provide results from logit models in the Online 
Supplement, for robustness. Because of randomi-
zation, and the very limited data available at the 
teacher level based on the data sharing agreement 
with the SDP, the specifications are quite straight-
forward, and are as follows: 
yi = β0 + β1 · SocialRewardsi 
               + β2 · 2016Completioni 
               + β3 · 2016Ineligiblei + γ + ε  
(1) 
  
yi = β0 + β1 · Identityi  
               + β2 · 2016Completioni 
               + β3 · 2016Ineligiblei + γ + ε 
(2) 
  
yi = β0 + β1 · IdentityOnlyi 
               + β2 · SocialRewardOnlyi  
               + β3 · (SocialRewards+Identity)i 
               + β4 · 2016Completioni  
               + β5 · 2016Ineligiblei + γ + ε 
(3) 
  
yi = β0 + β1 · Identityi 
               + β2 · GoodTeachersi 
               + β3 · (Identityi · GoodTeachersi) 
               + β4 · 2016Completioni 
               + β5 · 2016Ineligiblei + ε 
(4) 
  
yi = β0 + β1 · SocialRewardsi  
               + β2 · GoodTeachersi  
               + β3 · (SocialRewardsi · GoodTeachersi) 
               + β4 · 2016Completioni  








Note that γ in specifications 1, 2, 3, and 6 
refer to school fixed effects, while the variables 
“2016Completion” and “2016Ineligible” together 
constitute a control for survey completion behavior 
of a given teacher in the previous year (teachers 
could either have done the survey the previous year, 
not done it the previous year when eligible, or not 
been eligible to do it the previous year because they 
did not work at the SDP at the time). 
Specifications 1-3 are all simple measure-
ments of average treatment effects, using OLS re-
gressions. Specification 1 estimates the causal im-
pact of social rewards as a main effect, with con-
trols for last year’s survey completion behavior and 
school fixed effects. Specification 2 does the same 
but for the identity salience manipulation. Specifi-
cation 3 includes all experimental conditions, and 
therefore includes the interaction condition involv-
ing both manipulations. Note that we also run the 
analysis from specifications 1 and 2 separately for 
teachers from schools of various overall perfor-
mance levels (or “tiers”), as reported publicly by the 
SDP, to assess how measures of school quality 
might interact with intervention efficacy (one of 
our secondary questions of interest). 
Specifications 4-6 allow us to conduct ex-
ploratory analyses involving interactions between 
the experimental conditions and two important 
baseline variables. First, Specifications 4 and 5 in-
teract the two main effects with a dummy variable 
identifying teachers who work in schools with more 
highly-rated teachers, a designation that we deter-
mined using a school-level metric on teacher effec-
tiveness from the 2015-2016 SDP School Progress 
Report (SPR). Specifically, we used the SPR meas-
ure that reported on the percentage of teachers at a 
given school who received an effectiveness rating 
of “distinguished,” and identified schools with high 
teacher quality as those whose percentage of “dis-
tinguished” teachers was above the median. Second, 
Specification 6 interacts the identity main effect 
with a dummy variable for whether or not a teacher 
completed the annual teacher survey in 2016, the 
year prior to this experiment. This was done to de-
termine if identity salience manipulations were 
more impactful when they aligned with the idea of 
“consistency” with past behavior (in this case, com-




Figure 1 and Table 3 present the results related to 
yi = β0 + β1 · Identityi 
               + β2 · 2016Completioni 
               + β3 · (Identityi · 2016Completioni) 





Survey completion by condition (std. error marked) 
 
 
Notes: The dotted lines indicate ±5pp from the Standard treatment mean, which we determined a priori to be the thresh-
old for a meaningful effect. 




our main three hypotheses. As is apparent from 
visual inspection of Figure 1, neither the social re-
wards treatment nor the identity salience manipu-
lation increased survey completion—if anything, 
they reduced it slightly. This is confirmed in the re-
gression results in Table 3: in the specifications that 
estimate main effects with controls (columns 2 and 
4), the coefficients on the identity and social re-
wards treatments are -0.2 and -0.8 percentage 
points, respectively. The results of all other speci-
fications are quite similar. Likewise, the identity sa-
lience manipulation does not positively interact 
with the social rewards treatment. If anything, the 
interaction is slightly negative: the coefficient on 
the interaction is roughly -1 percentage point (Ta-
ble 3, columns 5 and 6). 
To better understand how school charac-
teristics predict survey completion, we next con-
duct non-experimental, exploratory analyses to de-
tect potential moderator variables for our treat-
ments. For this analysis, we use 21 school-level var-
iables for which we had at least 7,000 teacher ob-
servations (representing 87% of our sample), and 
two teacher-level variables capturing survey com-
pletion behavior in the previous year. In Table 4, 
we present the results of these analyses. Column 1 
Table 3 
Average treatment effects 
 
















Identity -0.00252 -0.00203 
    
 
(0.0110) (0.00943) 









    
-0.00356 -0.00108 
     
(0.0155) (0.0135) 
Social Rewards Only 
    
-0.00885 -0.00710 
     
(0.0155) (0.0132) 
Social Rewards + Identity 
    
-0.0102 -0.0100 
     
(0.0155) (0.0132) 


























Constant 0.585∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 0.734∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ 0.734∗∗∗  
(0.00777) (0.0571) (0.0078) (0.0570) (0.0109) (0.0574) 
Observations 8062 8062 8062 8062 8062 8062 
𝑅2 0.000 0.327 0.000 0.327 0.000 0.327 
School Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: This table shows the main results from this experiment, in the form of average treatment effects, using linear 
probability models. Specifications 1-2 show the average treatment effects of the Identity manipulation only, 3-4 show 
those for the Social Rewards manipulation only, and 5-6 show all treatment conditions (with the condition involving 
both manipulations), respectively. Regressions with and without controls are included–the controls are: 1) dummy 
variables for survey completion and ineligibility for the survey (meaning not employed by SDP) in the previous year 
(the omitted group being teachers eligible but not completing in the previous year); and 2) school fixed effects.  
 




presents the standardized coefficients from indi-
vidual single-variable regressions of survey com-
pletion on each of the 23 school- and teacher-level 
predictors. Column 2 presents the standardized co-
efficients from a multivariable regression of survey 
completion on all variables in column 1 at once.4 
Column 3 presents the results of a stepwise regres-
sion of survey completion on the same variables, 
ordered by the magnitude of the effect from col-
umn 1. We also explore the underlying structure of 
the relationship between school characteristics and 
survey completion using factor analysis with vari-
max (orthogonal) rotation. The analysis yielded 
three factors explaining 83% of the variance in all 
school characteristics. Column 4 presents the 
unique factor loadings of each of the school-level 
predictors when greater than 0.5. We see that the 
three factors map, respectively, onto metrics asso-
ciated with: (1) good student behavior (student at-
tendance, retention, etc.); (2) parent/student satis-
faction (student evaluations of teachers and school 
climate, parent evaluations of school climate, etc.); 
Table 4 
Linear probability models 
 









Climate Score (SPR) -0.063*** 0.308*** 0.300*** 1 
% Students w Attendance>95% -0.094*** -0.253*** -0.244*** 1 
Achievement Score (SPR) -0.051*** -0.262*** -0.238*** 1,3 
% Students w/ Positive view of Teacher Quality 0.057*** 0.197*** 0.226*** 2 
Climate Rating (Students) 0.074*** -0.188*** -0.222*** 2 
Student Retention Rate -0.083*** -0.153*** -0.154*** 1 
% Students Economically Disadvantaged -0.043*** -0.128*** -0.122*** 3 
% Teacher Effectiveness of Distinguished 0.046*** 0.115*** 0.097*** 3 
Enrollment -0.098*** -0.101*** -0.094*** 
 
Teacher Attendance Rate 0.093*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 
 
% Teacher Observation of Distinguished 0.034* 0.037 0.045* 3 
Climate Rating (Parents) 0.050*** -0.057** 
 
2 
Parent Survey Participation 0.082*** 0.047* 
 
2 
% Students in Special Education 0.094*** -0.034 
 
1 
% Students w/ Zero In-School Suspensions 0.003 -0.030 
  
Serious Incidents (per capita) 0.050*** -0.029 
 
1 





% Students Female 0.013 -0.015 
  
% Students Black 0.054*** 0.010 
  
Suspensions (per capita) 0.064*** -0.008 
 
1 
Progress Score (SPR) -0.042*** -0.002 
  
      
Teacher-level 
predictors 
Completed 2016 Survey (if eligible) 0.246***    
Completed 2016 Survey  0.228*** 0.228***  
Ineligible for 2016 Survey 0.031 0.116*** 0.114***  
      
 Observations >7129 7101 7101  
 R-squared  0.121 0.117  
Notes: This table shows linear probability models of school-level variables predicting teacher survey completion using 
single (Column 1), multiple (Column 2), and stepwise (Column 3) regression (using p<.00434 as removal criteria), as well 
as factor analysis (Column 4). Predictors and dependent measures are standardized; listed coefficients represent the change 
in standard deviations of survey completion for each standard deviation change in the predictor variable. A Bonferroni 
correction is used for 23 multiple comparisons and the variables are presented in the order of statistical significance. 
*p<.00434, **p<.00217, ***p<.000434. 
 




and (3) quality teachers (teacher effectiveness rat-
ings at the school level, etc.). Follow-up analyses 
find that good student behavior negatively predicts 
survey completion, whereas the other two factors 
positively predict survey completion. 5 See Figure 1 
in the Online Supplement for details. 
We use these exploratory results to guide 
an investigation into whether our treatments had 
stronger effects for certain subpopulations. Specif-
ically, given that a teacher having completed the 
survey in the previous year and various school 
quality measures were important predictors of sur-
vey completion, we form a secondary hypothesis 
that our manipulations would have larger effects at 
schools with more highly-rated teachers and better 
overall performance metrics. The motivating idea 
here is that our treatments might work better when 
teachers feel a stronger sense of prosocial commit-
ment to their students, which may be more likely 
with better teachers or at better schools. 
Table 5 presents one test for this hypoth-
esis, using interaction effects between teacher qual-
ity at the school level and our manipulations to de-
termine if there was a larger impact from the ma-
nipulations at schools with more highly-rated 
teachers. To measure teacher quality here, we use a 
dummy variable marking schools as having “high 
quality” teachers if the percentage of teachers at 
that school receiving a “distinguished” evaluation 
in teacher effectiveness (an SPR measure) was 




 High Teach. Qual. School x  
Treatments 







Identity x High Teach. Qual. School 0.050**   
 (0.022)   
Social Rewards x High Teach. Qual. 
School 
 -0.0053  
  (0.022)  
Identity x 2016 Completion   0.0052 
   (0.020) 
High Teach. Qual. School 0.026* 0.054***  
 (0.016) (0.016)  
Identity -0.033**  -0.0078 
 (0.016)  (0.015) 
Social Rewards  -0.0050  
  (0.016)  
Completed in 2016 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.20*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) 
Ineligible in 2016 0.20*** 0.20***  
 (0.019) (0.019)  
Constant 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.76*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.055) 
Observations 7616 7616 7130 
𝑅2 0.056 0.056 0.340 
School Fixed Effects N/A N/A Yes 
Notes: This table shows the results from linear probability models evaluating the interactions between the 
pooled treatments and two baseline characteristics: 1) specifications 1-2 interact each of the manipulations 
with a 2015-2016 metric for high teacher quality at the school level (a dummy variable identifying schools 
with an above-median percentage of teachers getting a "distinguished" rating); and 2) specification 3 interacts 
the identity manipulation with whether or not a teacher completed the survey in the previous year, 2016, to 
test for the presence of "consistency" as a motivation (note this regression omits teachers not employed by 
SDP in 2016). Specification 3 includes school fixed effects.  
 




not have individual-level measures of teacher qual-
ity. Also note that Table 4 also presents the results 
for our secondary question of interest, regarding 
the importance of “consistency” as a behavioral 
motivation (measured using the interaction of past 
survey completion with the identity manipulation). 
We do find a fairly large positive interac-
tion between the identity salience manipulation and 
teacher quality at the school level: the coefficient 
on the interaction is 5.0 percentage points (Table 
5, column 1). However, note that the coefficient of 
the identity salience manipulation (indicating the 
impact of the identity salience manipulation in 
schools with relatively lower teacher ratings) is -3.3 
percentage points in this specification. Thus, the 
identity salience manipulation has, on net, a small 
positive effect in schools where teachers were 
more highly-rated. We find no meaningful interac-
tion between the social rewards treatment and 
teacher quality at the school level, however (Table 
5, column 2), or between the identity salience ma-
nipulation and prior-year survey completion (Table 
5, column 3). We interpret these results as evidence 
that our manipulations (and identity salience in par-
ticular) were relatively less efficacious in schools 
where teachers received lower ratings on average, 
though this is more suggestive than definitive. 
To further explore the link between 
school quality and the effectiveness of our manip-
ulations, we present disaggregated treatment ef-
fects in Table 6. Specifically, in this analysis we dis-
aggregate by a measure of school quality: namely, 
which overall “tier” of school performance the 
school had been placed in by the SDP. This tier 
classification was based on publicly-available 
“School Progress Report” metrics generated by the 
city, and ranged from the lowest tier (‘intervene’) 
to intermediate tiers (‘watch’ and ‘reinforce’) to the 
highest tier (‘model’). This analysis serves as a “sec-
ond test” of whether our manipulations varied in 
efficacy based on school quality, broadly defined. 
In this case, we do not observe much difference in 
the estimates across schools of different quality, 
Table 6 
Disaggregated ATEs by school quality (SPR Tier) 
 
 School Progress Report Category 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Intervene Intervene Watch Watch Reinforce Reinforce Model Model 
Identity -0.00806  -0.00270  -0.00264  0.0225  
 (0.0154)  (0.0153)  (0.0244)  (0.0422)  
Social  
Rewards 
 -0.00871  -0.00413  -0.00951  -0.0134 
  (0.0153)  (0.0153)  (0.0242)  (0.0413) 
Completed in 
2016 
0.219*** 0.219*** 0.190 0.190*** 0.248*** 0.248*** 0.0896** 0.0909* 
 (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0301) (0.0302) (0.0449) (0.0449) 
Ineligible in 
2016 
0.189*** 0.189*** 0.153 0.153*** 0.121*** 0.121** -0.0727 -0.0683 
 (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0518) (0.0516) (0.107) (0.1080) 
Constant 0.727*** 0.727*** 0.946 0.947*** 0.785*** 0.789*** 0.768*** 0.787*** 
 (0.0583) (0.0583) (0.0255) (0.0256) (0.0370) (0.0356) (0.0726) (0.0752) 
Observations 3000 3000 2977 2977 1220 1220 361 361 
𝑅2 0.280 0.280 0.338 0.338 0.331 0.332 0.273 0.272 
School Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table shows disaggregated average treatment effects by school quality, using the 2015-2016 School 
Progress Report score tier category (defined by the SDP). Linear probability model results are shown, with qualita-
tively-similar margin estimates from logit regressions presented in the Online Appendix. It does this for each of the 
main effects (identity and social rewards), for each of the four possible score categories, from the lowest-performing 
schools ("Intervene") to the highest-performing schools ("Model"). All regressions include school fixed effects and 
dummy variables for survey completion and ineligibility for the survey (meaning not employed by the SDP) in the 
previous year (the omitted group being teachers eligible but not completing in the previous year). 
 




except that the point estimate for the identity inter-
vention at the best schools (‘model’ schools) is 
roughly 2-3 percentage points greater than for 
other schools. The difference is not statistically sig-
nificant, however, due primarily to the relatively 
small number of teachers who come from “model” 
schools in the sample. However, this observation 
does add some additional support to the idea that 
school quality may positively impact the effective-




In this article, we report the results of a randomized 
experiment testing the impact of social rewards and 
an identity salience manipulation on encouraging 
contributions to a public good: teachers completing 
an annual survey. We have three main results. First, 
we find that social incentives work just as well as 
personal incentives at motivating teachers to be 
prosocial. Second, we find no evidence that the 
identity salience manipulation increased prosocial 
behavior by teachers, nor did it meaningfully im-
prove the efficacy of social rewards as an incentive 
(relative to personal rewards). Third, exploratory 
analyses indicated that survey completion happens 
at a higher rate at schools where teachers are rated 
more highly, and we found suggestive evidence that 
our identity manipulation in particular may have 
been somewhat more effective in these schools. 
Our main conclusions, therefore, are as 
follows. First, although social incentives were not 
more effective than personal incentives (incon-
sistent with our hypothesis), the lack of difference 
between conditions has both theoretical and prac-
tical importance. If teachers were purely self-inter-
ested (as sometimes assumed by policymakers), 
then social incentives should have performed 
worse than personal incentives. Thus, the lack of 
difference between conditions implies that the 
teachers had at least somewhat other-regarding 
preferences. From a practical perspective, the lack 
of difference in effectiveness between social and 
personal incentives suggests that social incentives 
may be preferable from the point of view of the 
school district, as money spent by the district on 
social incentives (buying school supplies for stu-
dents) directly benefits students and does so with-
out undermining teacher motivation. This result 
speaks directly to a growing body of literature in 
public administration suggesting that interventions 
triggering prosocial motivations might be as or 
more efficacious as pay-for-performance schemes 
with public sector employees (Ritz, et al., 2016, 
Grant, 2008). 
Second, the lack of overall effect of our 
identity salience manipulation suggests that such 
manipulations, as implemented here, may not be a 
particularly promising approach for motivating ag-
gregate teacher survey completion. Whether such 
incentives would work better for outcomes that are 
more obviously related to teaching (and thus to 
teachers’ identities) remains to be seen. Further-
more, our exploratory results suggest that care 
should be taken regarding which sub-populations 
are targeted with such identity manipulations: the 
identity manipulation may have modestly reduced 
survey completion at schools where teachers re-
ceive lower ratings, while modestly increasing sur-
vey completion at schools with more highly rated 
teachers. 
In addition to these main conclusions re-
garding our experimental treatments, exploratory 
analyses revealed interesting patterns regarding the 
school-level and individual-level predictors of 
teacher survey completion. First, teachers at 
schools with more satisfied parents and students 
were more likely to complete these surveys. Sec-
ond, teachers at schools where students had fewer 
behavioral issues (e.g. lower suspension rates and 
higher attendance rates) were less likely to complete 
these surveys. Third, teachers at schools where 
teachers were rated highly were more likely to com-
plete these surveys. One counterintuitive takeaway 
from these findings is that one method to increase 
rates of similar teacher feedback is to target schools 
at which students are well-behaved. Assessing the 
replicability of these relationships, and understand-
ing their mechanisms, may be a fruitful direction 
for future research. 
One might argue that our lack of signifi-
cant results is driven by the fact that teachers simply 
did not read the emails they received carefully. 
While we cannot be certain, we have reason to be-
lieve that this was not the case. In particular, the 
SDP provided some anecdotal evidence that teach-
ers were aware of the social/personal rewards, and 
were both providing feedback about and asking for 
more information about the timing of these re-
wards as the survey period came to a close. This 
does not necessarily mean that they read and inter-
nalized the identity salience manipulation, but it 
does suggest that teachers did not ignore the con-
tent of the email. Furthermore, to the extent that 




the identity manipulation seemed to have been neg-
atively impactful at schools with lower-rated teach-
ers and positively impactful at schools with highly-
rated teachers, this suggests that teachers did read 
the emails with sufficient care to notice the manip-
ulation. 
Another similar response to our results 
might be that the manipulations were simply too 
subtle to change behavior. While we are sympa-
thetic to this view, we do not find it especially com-
pelling. This intervention involved four separate 
emails that reinforced the treatment messaging, 
which is a reasonably strong manipulation when 
compared to other manipulations of messaging in 
the broader literature that uses behavioral interven-
tions of this sort (Kessler & Milkman, 2016, Bur-
sztyn & Jensen, 2015, Bryan et al., 2011, Shang et 
al., 2008). 
It is also plausible that teachers are already 
quite strongly saturated in their “teacher identity” 
when receiving the emails, meaning that an identity 
salience manipulation could not influence behavior 
very much. In other words, there may not have 
been much “room” for the manipulation to 
strengthen the influence of identity considerations 
on decision making. Here again, the fact that we do 
see variance in the efficacy of the identity manipu-
lation as a function of school quality provides some 
evidence that this explanation is not fully satisfying. 
In particular, our finding that the identity salience 
manipulation did positively influence survey com-
pletion at schools with highly rated teachers (where 
teachers may identify more strongly with a teacher 
identity) somewhat weakens the case for already-
high salience of identity across the board being the 
reason for the small aggregate effect. 
Furthermore, one might argue that our 
null results on social versus personal rewards are 
influenced by the fact that teachers often use per-
sonal money to pay for school supplies for their 
students anyway, making our “social rewards” 
more similar to our “personal rewards” than they 
could have been. To the extent that this is an issue, 
future work might test a more unambiguous form 
of social reward, like a donation in the teacher’s 
name to a school-specific scholarship or charitable 
fund, instead of a gift card for school supplies.  
There are important limitations of our 
findings. First, we were unable to include a control 
group that received no incentive at all, both because 
of SDP priorities and because of concerns about 
spillover effects if we had a control group not re-
ceiving incentives. As a result, we cannot say how 
much the incentives increased survey completion, 
but can only conclude that social rewards were 
roughly as effective as personal ones. Though this 
particular context may not be ideal for an experi-
ment on incentives with a pure control group, fu-
ture work in this area would do well to have a pure 
control group to measure the causal impact of in-
centives in general, perhaps through variations in 
when teachers are informed about the lottery incen-
tives (before vs. after they complete the survey, for 
example). 
Second, we were not able to observe which 
teachers actually read the email soliciting survey 
completion (and thus who were actually influenced 
by the treatment). It may be that the treatments 
would appear substantially more effective if we 
were able to focus on those who were actually 
treated. 
Third, in terms of how our results inform 
the broader literature on cooperation and public 
goods, our outcome (survey completion) may not 
ideal. Although it is true that survey completion is 
a public good, many of the teachers may not have 
actually perceived the survey as creating benefits 
for others. This could be due to skepticism about 
the effectiveness of the school bureaucracy or a 
perception of red tape (Dehart-Davis & Pandey, 
2005; Pandey & Scott, 2002). Thus, their prosocial 
motivations may not have been engaged in the task. 
If this was indeed the case, our manipulations may 
have been more effective for outcomes that were 
more obviously prosocial. 
Finally, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that some treatments might have improved the 
“quality” of the sample (i.e., the representativeness 
of teachers responding) or of the survey responses 
(i.e., the detail and thoughtfulness of the feedback) 
without affecting the completion rate. However, 
while we have no way of testing the latter possibility 
with our data, we believe the former is not espe-
cially likely given that we find few meaningful dif-
ferences in school-level characteristics across treat-
ments. 
In sum, we found little impact of social 
versus personal incentives and of identity salience 
on teacher survey completion. Our results suggest 
that school districts, and public sector organiza-
tions more broadly, should further investigate the 
use of social incentives, as such incentives are often 




preferable so long as they do not undermine moti-
vation. The limited aggregate impact of the identity 
manipulation, on the other hand, contributes to a 
growing literature that goes beyond just identifying 
promising nudges to testing when those nudges ac-
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1. Note that the initial randomization consisted 
of 8,423 teachers, but we removed 361 teachers 
from the analysis who were not (for various 
reasons) active SDP teachers as of May 31st, 
2017. This was done based on advice from the 
SDP and does not affect the results, since these 
individuals were by and large not employed by 
the SDP when the surveys were distributed. 
2. Note that the sample for this intervention did 
not include charter school teachers, though 




4. Note that the regression in column 2 includes 
teacher-level control variables for: 1) complet-
ing the survey in 2016; and 2) not being eligible 
to complete the survey in 2016. These two 
dummies allow us to control for the three-
value categorical variable capturing teacher be-
havior in 2016 survey completion (ineligible to 
complete, completed, or did not complete 
when eligible). This differs from the treatment 
of teacher-level variables in column 1, which 
includes single variable regressions for: 1) the 
ineligible dummy variable; and 2) a binary var-
iable for whether or not a teacher completed 
the survey conditional on being eligible (a re-
gression that excludes ineligible individuals). 
We did the analysis in column 1 in this way to 
make the coefficient for 2016 survey comple-
tion easier to meaningfully interpret. 
5. Because the inferences drawn from any indi-
vidual regression method presented in Col-
umns 1-3 of Table 4 may suffer from bias or 
constitute spurious correlation, we include all 
three to triangulate our understanding of which 
school-level variables are most strongly associ-
ated with teacher survey completion. We sug-
gest that more confidence can be put in this re-
lationship when a variable is a significant pre-
dictor across multiple regression specifications. 
To that end, Table 4 presents the school-level 
variables in descending order of the apparent 
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Figure A1: Treatment email screenshots (for first emails, sent on April 4, 2017; screenshots 
of three follow-up reminder emails visible in online appendix, Figures 2-5) 
 
 






















(d)  “Social Reward + Identity” condition 
 
 
 
 
